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United States v. Bryan Vance Jones:  CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS IN 
STATUTORY SUPPRESSION REMEDY IN THE CONTEXT OF PRIVACY 
 
I. Introduction 
In United States v. Jones,1 the District Court held that the 
defendant could not suppress the e-mail messages obtained by 
informant in violation of the Title III of the Omnibus Crime and 
Control and Safe Street Act of 1968 (“Wiretap Act”)2 as amended 
by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA").3  
The ECPA amended the Wiretap Act to include not only the 
prohibition of the intentional interception and disclosure of 
oral and wire communications but also electronic communications.  
This comment explores the Wiretap Act’s constitutionality 
or legitimacy in light of the Fourth Amendment protections.  
More specifically, the comment focuses on the injustice created 
by a statute that punishes the violator but does not remedy the 
harm suffered by the victim.  Further, this comment will address 
the suppression remedy’s failure to keep with the times by 
excluding electronic communications such as unlawfully obtained 
e-mail messages.   
While keeping in mind the courts interests in refraining to 
act as a super-legislature, this comment will set out reasons 
why the court should have looked beyond the plain language of 
                                                
1 364 F.Supp.2d 1303 (D.Utah 2005).   
 
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22(2006).   
 
3 Pub.L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). 
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the statute and afforded a Constitutional remedy for the 
defendant.   
The court circumvents the issue of addressing the violation 
of the Wiretap Act – “whether the confidential informant 
unlawfully intercepted Mr. Jones' private email correspondence 
is a complicated factual inquiry that is ultimately irrelevant 
to this motion.”4  Instead, the court assumed that the e-mail 
correspondence was unlawfully intercepted and focuses on whether 
the Wiretap Act provides a suppression remedy.   
Although the Wiretap Act prevents interception of illegally 
intercepted electronic communication, the court said once the e-
mail is intercepted, the defendant must use a suppression remedy 
to prevent the e-mail from being allowed in as evidence.5  
Consequently, the unlawfully intercepted e-mail messages were 
admitted because the statute’s literal language does not cover 
the suppression of electronic communications.   
The court's focus on the conclusion that “the Wiretap Act's 
suppression remedy would be unavailable to Mr. Jones even if the 
informant unlawfully intercepted his messages”6 reveals the 
court’s failure to look beyond the plain language of the statute 
and to the U.S. Constitution.  In Griswold v. Connecticut, “the 
                                                
4  United States v. Jones, 364 F.Supp.2d at 1305 (D. Utah 2005). 
   
5 Id. 
 
6 Id. at 1306.   
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Supreme Court has interpreted the U.S. Constitution as providing 
a fundamental ‘right to privacy’, located within the undefined 
‘penumbras’ of the Bill of Rights.”7  While the U.S. Constitution 
does not explicitly mention privacy, the protection of privacy 
exists as evidenced by the combination of the different 
protections afforded by First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth 
Amendments.8  As a result, the notion of “personal liberty 
contained in the Bill of Rights guarantees a ‘right to privacy’ 
                                                
7 Katherine A. Oyama, E-Mail Privacy After United States 
v.Councilman: Legislative Options For Amending ECPA, 1 Berkeley 
Tech L.J. 499 (2006), (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 483-85 (1965) (stating that the U.S. Constitution protects 
the right to privacy although its text does not explicitly 
reference the term "privacy"). For example, privacy is protected 
by the First Amendment's freedom of association clause and 
guarantee of the right to speak anonymously, the Third 
Amendment's protection for privacy of the home, the Fourth 
Amendment's guarantee that people have the right "to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures ..." and the Fifth 
Amendment's right against self-incrimination. Daniel J. Solove & 
Marc Rotenberg, Information Privacy Law 20-21 (2003) (citing 
U.S. Const. amends. I, III-V). 
8 Id.   
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encompassing both ‘explicit protection against government 
intrusion into the home and personal effects.’”9  
With these weighty constitutional protections in the 
background, rather than focus on the aspect of privacy granted 
to the citizen, the court overlooks the constitutional 
protections and centers around the absence of an applicable 
suppression remedy in the plain language of the Wiretap Act.10  
Regardless of whether the electronic communication had been 
illegally intercepted, the court denies the defendant a remedy 
for violation of his right to privacy.  In its literal reading, 
the suppression remedy within the Wiretap Act does not give an 
equal remedy to electronic communications as it does to oral or 
wire communications.11  As a result, defendant’s motion to 
suppress was denied on Fourth Amendment grounds.12   
II. Background 
 
 The defendant, Mr. Jones, sought to suppress evidence 
turned over to the FBI by an informant.13  The evidence that the 
                                                
9 See id., (citing Will Thomas DeVries, Note, Protecting Privacy 
in the Digital Age, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 283, 286 (2003) and 
"implicit protection of autonomy and free choice.”). 
10 United States v. Jones, 364 F.Supp.2d 1303 (D.Utah 2005). 
 
11 Id.    
 
12 Id.  
 
13 Id. at 1305.   
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defendant sought to suppress were his personal e-mail messages 
intercepted by the informant.14  Using the information contained 
in those e-mail messages, the FBI obtained a warrant to search 
the defendant’s computer.15  Hence, the information found during 
the warranted search was used against the defendant.16   
The defendant invoked the Wiretap Act to show that the e-
mail messages that had warranted the search had been obtained in 
violation of the Wiretap Act.17  The defendant further argued 
that if the e-mail messages had been unlawfully obtained, the 
evidence derived from the search warrant should be suppressed.18   
To support his claim, the defendant compelled discovery to 
reveal the method in which the informant obtained the e-mail 
messages.19  But the court denied defendant’s motion to compel 
discovery of both the identity of the informant witness and the 
means by which the informant accessed defendant’s private email 
account.20  Court affirmed the government’s refusal to release 
the identity of the informant – “To protect the safety of that 
                                                
14 Id.   
 




17 Id. at 1305.   
 
18 Id.  
 
19 Id.  
 
20 Id.  
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informant, this court refused to order disclosure of the 
information for reasons stated at greater length in the sealed 
transcript.”21  Thus, the government protected both the 
informant’s identity and the method in which the e-mail messages 
were obtained.22 
To remedy the lack of information regarding the informant, 
this court set out a hypothetical situation:  
This court articulated a "hypothetical" containing  
the relevant facts to provide Mr. Jones sufficient  
basis for presenting his claim about the Wiretap Act.23 
According to the hypothetical, Mr. Jones used a  
computer at a local public library in order to  
access his email account.24 After leaving the library 
computer station, Mr. Jones' email account remained 
accessible, and a librarian discovered the email  
messages in Mr. Jones' account.25  Mr. Jones argues  
that these facts constitute a violation of the  
Wiretap Act that should lead to the suppression  
of evidence.26 
 
Now turning to the issue of whether the e-mail messages 
were obtained unlawfully by the informant, the court examined 
the history of the Wiretap Act.  With the passage of the ECPA, 
Fourth Amendment protections to cyberspace have evolved to 
                                                
21 Id.  
 
22 Id.  
 
23 Id.  
 
24 Id.  
 
25 Id.  
 
26 Id.  
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include electronic communications.27  While ECPA is far from 
policing and guarding the realm of cyberspace, “ECPA's 
procedural safeguards concerning stored communications address 
the gap left by the unclear application of the Fourth Amendment 
to cyberspace.”28  The courts interpretation of the “ECPA's 
statutory framework is thus increasingly important to protecting 
personal privacy in the digital age.”29  Before the ECPA was 
enacted, the Wiretap Act covered only wire (voice) and oral 
communications from unlawful interception.30  But Title I of 
ECPA, the Wiretap Act, extended the federal wiretap law's 
protections to electronic communications.31   
The Wiretap Act makes it illegal for anyone to 
"intentionally intercept[] ... any wire, oral, or 
electronic communication."32  The court looks to  
Section 2515 which “provides the sole suppression  
remedy for unlawfully intercepted communications.33  
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been 
intercepted, no part of the contents of such  
communication and no evidence derived therefrom may  
be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or  
other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, 
department, officer, agency, regulatory body,  
                                                
27 Id. at 1306.   
 
28 Katherine A. Oyama, E-Mail Privacy After United States  
v.Councilman: Legislative Options For Amending ECPA, 1 Berkeley  
Tech L.J. 499 (2006). 
 
29 Id. at 503.  
  
30 Id. at 504. 
 
31  S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1.   
 
32 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(a)(2006).   
33 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2006). 
   
 8 
legislative committee, or other authority of the  
United States, a State, or a political subdivision  
thereof if the disclosure of that information would  
be in violation of this chapter.”34   
 
While the Wiretap Act was amended to protect the unlawful 
interception of electronic communications, in the plain language 
of the statute, the court could not find a suppression remedy 
for electronic communications already unlawfully intercepted.35  
As a result, the defendant attempted to unsuccessfully argue an 
abstract “negative implication” theory.36   
In essence, Mr. Jones argues that, because § 2517(3) 
permits disclosure at a judicial proceeding of the  
contents of intercepted electronic communications when  
the contents were received by authorized means, the 
converse is also true-that is, that electronic 
communications not intercepted by authorized means are 
necessarily excluded from testimony at a judicial 
proceeding.37 
 
Because of the court’s disinclination to repeal rules by 
implication, the court rejected defendant’s negative implication 
theory and interpreted the statute according to the plain 
meaning of the language.38  Another theory the defendant tried to 
                                                
34  Id.  
 
35 Katherine A. Oyama, E-Mail Privacy After United States  
 
v.Councilman: Legislative Options For Amending ECPA, 1 Berkeley  
 
Tech L.J. 499 (2006). 
 
36 United States v. Jones, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1307. 
 
37 Id. at 1307. 
 
38 Id.  
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argue was the possibility that the informant had obtained the e-
mail password “by means of an unlawful wire or oral 
interception” and any information “derived therefrom” is 
“subject to suppression.”39  Thus, the defendant proposes the 
theory that the informant had received the information to access 
the e-mail (such as the password to defendant’s e-mail) by oral 
or wire communications.40  If this scenario were true, the e-mail 
messages, as evidence derived from the unlawfully obtained oral 
or wire communications could qualify under the suppression 
remedy and be suppressed.41   
This theory was unconvincing due to the lack of evidence 
and the specific manner in which the informant must have 
unlawfully intercepted the wire or oral communication.42  Using 
the current definition of wire communications, the government 
filed an underseal pleading refuting defendant’s claim that the 
e-mail messages were derived from oral or wire communications.43  
Further, the defendant’s theory did not avail due to the 
                                                
39 Id. at 1309.   
 
40 Id.  
 







requirement that the oral or wire communications must have been 
obtained by some mechanical or other type of device.44 
Had the defendant been able to get around the suppression 
remedy problem, the defendant could have proposed another theory 
under the Stored Communications Act, or SCA.45  However, the 
defendant did not have cause to invoke the SCA and instead 
attempted to use the Wiretap Act to suppress the unlawfully 
obtained e-mail messages.  
Consequently, defendant attempts to repeal section 2517 by 
negative implication and prove that the informant obtained the 
password through oral or wire communications using an electronic 
or mechanical device fails.  And the defendant loses the case on 
the finding that the suppression remedy does not cover 
electronic communications.46 
III. Analysis 
The formal definition of “wire communications” included 
electronic communications and is probative evidence of the 
almost identical nature of the two types of communications.47  
The fact that electronic communications had been a type of 
communication recognized as wire communications is a strong 
suggestion that the two are related.  However, the ECPA recently 
                                                
44 Id. 
 
45 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000). 
 




revised the definition of “wire communication" to explicitly 
exclude electronic communications (instead made a separate 
categorical definition for electronic communications):   
Any aural transfer made in whole or in part through  
the use of facilities for the transmission of 
communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other  
like connection ... furnished or operated by any  
person engaged in providing or operating such  
facilities for the transmission of interstate or  
foreign communications or communications affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce and such term includes  
any electronic storage of such communication.48 
 
Without access to information on how the informant 
unlawfully intercepted the e-mail messages, the defendant’s case 
was greatly debilitated.  Thus, the mysterious and non-disclosed 
nature of the informants’ identity and the situation surrounding 
the interception really made an impact as to the available 
arguments for the defendant. And the court successfully 
established a firm guard around the identity of the informant.   
Nevertheless, the court focused on the technical language 
of the Wiretap Act and seemed to lose sight of the main purpose 
of the Wiretap Act—to protect a citizen’s “reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”49  In the midst of the uncertainty in 
cyberspace law and the Fourth Amendment, the court, while 
interpreting the law in the area of privacy, must not neglect 
                                                
48 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)(2000).   
 
49 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
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the “reasonable expectation of privacy test” set in Katz v. 
United States.50   
In this case, the Supreme Court found that the Fourth 
Amendment requires law enforcement to obtain a search warrant 
when monitoring phone calls made from a public telephone booth.51  
In his concurrence in Katz, Justice Harlan articulated the 
"reasonable expectation of privacy test" for determining whether 
the Constitution protects an individual's right to privacy from 
intrusion by the government.52  The two-pronged test requires 
that (1) an individual "have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy," and (2) "the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as [objectively] 
‘reasonable.'"53   
IV. Evaluation 
 
As technology develops and e-mail “becomes more commonplace 
means of communication,” it is objectively reasonable for the 
members of modern-day society to expect that unlawfully obtained 
e-mail messages will be barred from being used against them in a 
                                                
50 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 
51 Id. at 361. 
 
52 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  See generally, Daniel J. 
 
Solove & Marc Rotenberg, Information Privacy Law 21 (2003).   
 
53 Id. at 361.   
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criminal or civil trial.54  Because of the tremendous 
advancements in technology, more and more people are adopting e-
mail into their everyday lives.  Therefore, it may be 
objectively reasonable for members of society to expect that 
their e-mails will be provided the same degree of protection 
given to other forms of communications such as wire or oral.  
For example, many more people are sending out e-mails on a daily 
basis rather than picking up the phone or sending out faxes.   
Yet, due to the uncertainty and open nature of cyberspace, 
it is undeniable that e-mail is not a very private means of 
communication.  Once a person sends out an e-mail, the sender 
has risked the possibility that someone other than the intended 
recipient may get a hold of the e-mail.  It can also be thought 
that the person sending the e-mail has essentially dropped off 
his personal communication into public space for public eyes.55 
The ability of people to obtain passwords either through 
eavesdropping or even through more technologically advance 
means, such as hacking, has contributed to the numerous 
instances where people’s e-mails have been intercepted by 
unintended recipients.  While the unknown and mysterious nature 
of cyberspace may give many people a sense of security, in 
reality, people are mistaken about the level of security.  The 
                                                
54 Robert A. Pikowsky, Privilege and Confidentiality of Attorney- 
 
Client Communication Via E-mail, 51 Baylor L. Rev. 483 (1999). 
   
55 Id. 
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ease with which a person’s e-mail may be accessed is evidenced 
by looking at your own life where you hear of friends and family 
accessing each other’s e-mail accounts.   
Consequently, society may be unreasonable in having an 
expectation of privacy in their e-mail communications.  Yet, 
because e-mail is so commonly used and relied upon by 
corporations and individuals, e-mail has become almost a 
necessity to everyday life.  The minor differences between e-
mail and regular mail should not prevent the law from bestowing 
the same protections to the realm of cyberspace.   
Another interesting point that should be raised is the fact 
that electronic communications were formally within the 
definition of wire communications.  The almost interchangeable 
nature of electronic and wire communications should shed some 
light on why e-mail should be given the same privacy protections 
given to wire or oral communications.  In other words, e-mail 
should not be treated any different from wire and oral 
communications.   
It is highly arguable that the same protections given to 
regular mail need to be given to e-mail because people expect 
the same protections given to regular mail to be given to e-
mail.  The reasons for these expectations are ingrained in the 
very nature of e-mail.  The fact that the communication is 
electronic and paperless gives e-mail a uniquely private and 
protected quality.  E-mail is further protected by that fact 
 15 
that another person may not access your e-mail communication 
without a password.  Thus, in reliance of these protections 
inherent in e-mail, corporations and individuals alike send out 
private communications via e-mail on a daily basis.   
While the internet and technology is a confusing and 
unsettled area of law, the court must not neglect the goals of 
Fourth Amendment privacy protections of “reasonable expectations 
of privacy.”56  The open and untouchable nature of the internet 
may thwart the court from affording the same privacy protections 
to e-mail as it does to mail.   
However, regardless of whether a private communication 
travels through air or cyberspace, the medium of communication 
should not have an impact on the protection of privacy given by 
the law.  Just as the transition of the law developed during the 
telephone era and other forms of wire devices, the law should 
conform to the changing needs of the society.  It is evident 
that e-mail is quickly broadening its reach through America.  
And people are becoming more and more reliant on e-mail due to 
the many beneficial features of e-mail such as speed, 
efficiency, and ease of use.  The law should respond to these 
technological advances because a citizen’s expectation of 
privacy should be the same as to any type of private 
communication whether it be electronic, oral, or paper.   
                                                
56 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
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Understandably, this is a controversial issue with strong 
argument on both sides of the table and courts must continually 
develop case law with the proper backdrop in mind.  As new 
issues arise and present difficult problems, the courts ought to 
never lose focus on the goal of the Fourth Amendment – to 
protect the “reasonable expectation of privacy.”57   
A. Reasons to Find a Constitutional Remedy 
Before us now is the issue of whether e-mail is secure 
enough to support a reasonable expectation of privacy.  For 
example, is e-mail secure enough to sustain the attorney-client 
privilege and satisfy the attorney's ethical obligation to 
preserve client confidences?58 
In the unlikely event that someone other than the intended 
recipient intercepts e-mail containing a confidential attorney-
client communication, does the communication retain its 
privilege?59  Has the attorney breached the ethical duty to 
safeguard confidential communications simply by exchanging 
                                                
57 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV ("Nor shall any State deprive any  
 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of  
 
law ... ."). 
 
58 Robert A. Polowsky, Privilege and Confidentiality of Attorney- 
 
Client Communication Via E-mail, 51 Baylor L. Rev. 483 (1999). 
 
59 Id.  
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sensitive e-mail with a client?60  Should attorney disciplinary 
authorities set out regulations governing the acceptable use of 
e-mail between attorney and client?61  These are all crucial 
questions, an attorney must consider before deciding to rely on 
the privacy protections afforded to e-mail before sending out 
privileged information.  Just how secure is e-mail?  And what 
should society’s expectations be as to the privacy of e-mail?  
These difficult questions are not answered in this case but are 
nonetheless pivotal in deciding whether the unlawfully 
intercepted e-mail messages should have been suppressed under 
the U.S. Constitution.   
Even if the suppression remedy in the Wiretap Act did not 
cover electronic communications, the court should not have 
stopped their assessment with the Wiretap Act.  A remedy not 
explicitly contained in a statute does not necessarily mean 
there is no remedy within the U.S. Constitution.  The court’s 
failure to look beyond the plain language of the Wiretap Act’s 
suppression remedy unjustly denied the defendant his privacy 
protections granted to him within the penumbras of the U.S. 
Constitution.62   
The court’s desire to give due regard to the legislature by 
deferring to the plain language of the statute instead of 
                                                
60 Id. 
 
61   Id. 
62 Id.    
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reading into the statute its own interpretation is honorable.  
Nevertheless, when a particular statute clearly leaves out an 
expected protection, the court should not turn a blind eye to 
the deficiency in the statute.  It is the courts role to step in 
and conduct the proper role of judicial review and serve as an 
appropriate check on the legislative and executive branch.   
B. Definitional Similarities Between Wire and Electronic 
Communications 
The similarities between the definition of wire 
communications and electronic communications in section 2510 
indicate that distinguishing the two types of communication is 
redundant.  The almost identical and overlapping nature of wire 
and electronic communications make it very difficult for even 
the sophisticated reader to clearly delineate where the 
differences lie.  The definition of wire communications is:   
Any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of 
facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid 
of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of 
origin and the point of reception (including the use of such 
connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by 
any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities 
for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications 
or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce.63 
 
The wire communication definition is almost indistinguishable 
 
from the definition of electronic communication.  Compare the  
 
definition of wire communication to the current definition of  
 
electronic communications:  
                                                




“electronic communication" means any transfer of  
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or 
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or  
in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,  
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects 
interstate or foreign commerce, but does not  
include-- 
(A) any wire or oral communication; 
(B) any communication made through a tone-only  
paging device; 
(C) any communication from a tracking device  
(as defined in section 3117 of this title); or 
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by  
a financial institution in a communications system  
used for the electronic storage and transfer of  
funds;64   
 
The two definitions both have to do with the transfer of 
communication by wire.  From comparing the two definitions, one 
can infer that certain types of electronic communications are in 
essence wire communications because both include transfers by 
wire.  So the confusion and difficulty in figuring out when a 
transfer by wire is an electronic communication and not wire 
communication lies in the technical difference between “aural 
transfers” and “transfers.”  The reasoning behind legislature to 
make this distinction is unclear.   
There may have been some scientific explanation for the 
differentiation between an aural transfer and a regular transfer 
but to the lay person, the separation seems to only cause 
confusion and redundancy.  The definitional similarities 
evidence the fact that the two areas of communication are 
                                                
64 18 U.S.C. 2510(12)(2000).   
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closely intertwined and should not be separated.  The fact that 
electronic communications transferred over wire are not aural 
transfers but simply transfers should not create reason to set 
electronic communications apart from wire communications.  
Hence, the technical difference between “aural transfers” and 
“transfers” should not provide reason for separation. 
 Both the fact that electronic communications had been once 
part of the definition of wire communications and the fact that 
the electronic communications had once been under the umbrella 
of wire communications suggest the unreasonableness in affording 
unequal privacy protections to both types of communication.   
C. Punishing the Perpetrator Without Affording a Remedy to 
the Victim is Inconsistent 
Then the question becomes, what is the purpose behind 
punishing the perpetrator but denying the victim an adequate 
remedy for the harm suffered.  In this case, the defendant’s e-
mail was unlawfully obtained and used against him.  While the 
informant unlawfully obtained the e-mails which led to the 
warrant of a search, the defendant had absolutely no remedy.  
This seems to open the door for people to hack into other 
people’s e-mails and threaten to turn over information using the 
protections of police immunity.   
Yet the court does not seem concerned with assessing the 
informants conduct but rather hiding the entire situation under 
a blanket immunity.  Therefore, the defendant is left with a 
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lost cause.  And while the informant could have violated many 
protections afforded even within the Wiretap Act, the defendant 
does not currently have a remedy to any of the violations.    
 Although there have been extensive amendments with the 
progression of technology and just as much thought put into new 
cyberspace law, e-mail is still not given the same protections 
as wire or oral communication.   
In this current e-mail age, it is impractical and 
nonsensical to differentiate between e-mail and other forms of 
communication.  While instant messaging and other forms of 
electronic communication may not be as widely used as e-mail, 
this generation of computer users is quickly incorporating 
“chatting” into their daily lives.  And soon instant messaging 
may be seen as another form of oral communication and be brought 
in the context of privacy.  As instant messaging and other forms 
of electronic communication become more secure and prevalent in 
society, the court must address in due time and afford the same 
privacy protections as needed.  But this issue is not within the 
scope of this comment.    
V. Conclusion 
The possibility that the suppression remedy’s exclusion of 
electronic communication may be in conflict with the privacy 
protections found within the “penumbras” of the U.S 
Constitution.  The courts assessment of society’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in e-mail is an area of law that has been 
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evolving.  But to deny a suppression Remedy and allow unlawfully 
obtained e-mails to be used against the victim is intrusion into 
the citizen’s constitutionally protected zone of privacy. 
Further, this exclusion of electronic communications seems 
to be out of line with the heavy reliance on the protection of 
privacy in e-mail by corporations and individuals alike.  As the 
use of e-mail progresses and area of technology advances, the 
courts should closely assess the reasonable expectations of 
privacy existing currently in society.   
 
 
 
